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NOTE
THE MILAGRO BEANFIELD WAR REVISITED
IN ENSENADA LAND AND WATER ASSOCIATION
V SLEEPER: PUBLIC WELFARE DEFIES TRANSFER
OF WATER RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
In John Nichols' novel' and the subsequent movie The Milagro Beanfield War, Joe Mondragon fought an unusual "war" to protect his right
to irrigate a beanfield. Had he gone to court instead of appropriating
unauthorized water, he might have legally won. In In Re Application of
Sleeper,2 a New Mexico district court applied the state's statutory public
welfare criteria3 to protect a traditional community culture, a decision of
first impression in Western water law. In effect, the decision attempted
to extend the scope of public welfare to protect local cultural values where
threatened by economic development. Widely hailed by cultural traditionalists, the victory was short-lived. The appellate court reversed the
decision on technical grounds.4 Nonetheless, the lower court's decision
indicates an escalating public concern for preservation of traditional communities and the cultural values they reflect.
This article first abstracts the historical and cultural environment of
rural northern New Mexico, where Sleeper unfolds. It subsequently delineates Sleeper's procedural history and analyzes the court holdings. It
then explains the purpose of the public welfare doctrine, how it evolved
and matured, and what it means to water appropriations. In conclusion,
this article addresses current public welfare issues.
THE ENSENADA BATTLEFIELD
Land and water disputes in northern New Mexico, which emerge from
an entangled background of changing sovereigns, generated historic repercussions for New Mexico and its inhabitants. 5 First the Hispanics6 and
I. J. Nichols, The Milagro Beanfield War (1974).
2. No. RA 84-53 (C), slip op. (N.M. Dist. Ct. Apr. 16, 1985) (Sleeper i), rev'd., 107 N.M.
494, 760 P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1988) (Sleeper 11), cert. quashed, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988).
3. The terms public welfare and public interest are interchangeable for purposes of this discussion.
Where cases and statutes specifically use "public interest," this article reflects that terminology.
Throughout the rest of this article, the author uses "public welfare" as a reflection of current New
Mexico water law statutes. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-5-23 (Supp. 1985).
4. Sleeper II, 107 N.M. at 494, 760 P.2d at 787.
5. See Rodriguez, Land, Water, and Ethnic Identity, in Land, Water, and Culture, 313 (1987).
6. Id. at 313. Rodiriquez uses "Hispano" rather than "Hispanic." Both terms refer to the subgroup
of Mexicanos or subsequently Mexican Americans who settled in the upper Rio Grande and adjacent
regions of northern New Mexico and southern Colorado. Id.
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Indians sought the same scarce resources; then the influx of Anglos joined
the pursuit. First the Spanish sovereigns applied Spanish law to resolve
the disputes; then the Mexicans employed the Mexican version of Spanish
law to the unremitting conflicts. Finally, the Americans maneuvered in
with new law and new interpretations of Spanish and Mexican law. Consequently, the disentanglement recast the Hispanics from the dominant
class into an "ethnic underclass" devoid of significant parcels of land
and water.7 Nevertheless, the Hispanics' tireless struggle to maintain their
diminishing land and water resources and the integrity of their lifestyle
endures, in part due to northern New Mexico's alluring combination of
cultural enchantment and scenic wildness.'
Against this rustic backdrop, an art colony burgeoned in the early
1900s, with the first tourism booms following in the 1920s and 30s., By
the 1970s, during the second tourism boom, ski resort developers were
entrenched in the expansion of Taos Ski Valley, buying up priority water
rights in the local area.'" As Taos Ski Valley chiseled out the mountain,
developers carved out land and water rights to support a year-round
recreation-based resort. Their activities spurred local Hispanic communities to protest development in order to preserve their land and water
base."
The MilagroBeanfield War reenacted the stand against Taos Ski Valley,
with Nichols' Hispanics defying Ladd Devine's efforts to encroach upon
their water rights. In an analogous scenario, in the early 1980s, the
Ensenada Land and Water Association (Ensenada Association) defied the
Tierra Grande Corporation when the corporation sought water from the
community water base."
In the late 1970s, the Tierra Grande Corporation began development
of a subdivision in conjunction with the development of a large ski resort. 3
It dug a gravel pit while in the process of developing the subdivision
roads and subsequently transformed the pit into a recreational lake for
the benefit of the subdivision. " To this end, Tierra Grande dammed the
Nutritas Creek, in violation of laws regarding the building of dams and
the diversion of water. " When the state engineer discovered the lake, he
ordered Tierra Grande to breach the dam.' 6 After complying with the
state engineer's orders, Tierra Grande contracted with two local property
7. Id. at 337.
8. Id. at 343.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 354.
II. id. at 360.
12. Sleeper 11, 107 N.M. at 494, 760 P.2d at 788.
13. Id. at 496, 760 PR2d at 789.
14. Id.
15, Sleeper 1, slip op. at 2.
16. Id.
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FIGURE 1. Prospectives of the Move to and Move from Locations in Relation
to the Ditches. Source: Sleeper 11, 107 N.M. at -. , 760 P.2d at
787.
owners (Applicants) to purchase their lands and appurtenant water rights.' 7
The parties conditioned the purchase upon the state engineer's approval
of the transfer application for change of purpose, place of use, and point
of diversion of those surface water rights. 8
The Applicants requested a one-time diversion of 61.32 acre-feet (acft) of water from Nutritas Creek to initially fill the lake and another 13.32
ac-ft annually to compensate for evaporative loss.' 9 To offset the water
loss, Applicants would temporarily retire 64.55 acres of irrigated land
the first year and permanently retire 14.02 acres of irrigated land thereafter.2
The Nutritas (see figure 1) is a tributary of the Rio Brazos, emptying
into the Ensenada Ditch and another ditch before it joins the Rio Brazos.2
The headgate of the Ensenada Ditch is on the Rio Brazos. 22 Fed mainly
from snowmelt, the Nutritas runs heavily during the spring and is dry by
late May or early June. 23 The Ensenada Association uses its waters, drawn
off the Ensenada Ditch, to fill irrigation reservoirs and to "fertilize" the
soil by providing rich silt.24 The Ensenada Association members use the
Rio Brazos water when the Nutritas goes dry.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Sleeper iI, 107 N.M. at 496, 760 P.2d at 789.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Sleeper I,slip op. at 4.
Sleeper !i, 107 N.M. at 496, 760 P.2d at 789.
d.
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The Ensenada Association is the focal point for maintaining Ensenada's
system of ditches, used to obtain domestic and irrigational water.' The
Ensenada Association is based upon the principle that each one of its
members contribute to the maintenance of the ditches. When a member
transfers water rights to a nonmember, the remaining members assume

the burden of maintaining the ditches and shouldering costs for which
the former member was responsible.2" The transfer of water rights used
for irrigation to a nonagricultural use also results in retirement of agricultural land.27 These factors---community expense shared by fewer people and "permanent" loss of agricultural land-were relevant public interest

factors in this case.
The Ensenada Association protested when Applicants applied for the

transfer of their surface water rights in 1982, alleging impairment of
existing rights and that the transfer would be contrary to the public in-

terest.2" Relying upon hydrologic studies and a finding that the transfer
would not cause impairment to existing water rights, the hearing examiner

recommended that the state engineer approve the application.29 The state

engineer's approval was in accord with the precedent of excluding public
interest in transfer decisions."
The Ensenada Association appealed the State Engineer's decision, and

the state district court reversed in a de novo hearing. 3 The court noted
that Section 72-5-7 of the New Mexico statutes authorized the state engineer to deny water appropriations of unappropriatedsurface water if
"approval thereof would be contrary to the public interest." 32 However,

the state statutes applicable to change of place of use, purpose, and point
of diversion of appropriatedsurface waters, Sections 75-5-23 and 75-54, articulated, only that "all water used in this state for irrigation
purposes.. . may be transferred for other purposes.. . if such changes
can be made without detriment to existing water rights." 3 4 Thus the state
25. See generally Miller, Changing Water Policy as the Basis for Land Use and Development in
New Mexico, I N.M. Nat. Res. L. Rptr. 24 (1986).
26. Sleeper 1, slip op. at 5.
27. Sleeper 11, 107 N.M. at 496, 760 P.2d at 789.
28. Id. at 495, 760 P.2d at 788.
29. The district court held that the transfer would impair existing rights because the water users
would be deprived of water traditionally used for livestock and for moistening the soil in the early
spring. Sleeper 1, slip op. at 4-5. Additionally, the users would be deprived of the silt content from
the waters of the Nutritas, which they had historically used to fertilize their soils. Id. at 5. The
appellate court held that the transfer would not impair existing rights because Protestants failed to
make a sufficient showing of impairment. Sleeper II, 107 N.M. at 499, 760 P.2d at 792, 793.
Furthermore, water rights do not include a right to receive a traditional or historical amount of silt
carried in the water. Id. at 499, 760 P.2d at 792.
30. Id. at 498, 760 P.2d at 791.
31. Sleeper I, slip op. at 7.
32. Sleeper HI, 107 N.M. at 498, 760 P.2d at 790-791 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-5-7 (1978)
(amended Supp. 1985)).
33. N.M. Stat, Ann. §§72-2-23, 72-2-24 (1978) (amended Supp. 1985).
34. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-5-23 (1978) (amended Supp. 1985).

Summer 1989]

ENSENADA LAND AND WATER ASSOCIATION V. SLEEPER

865

engineer was technically correct in refusing to consider more than impairment. However, in a classic case of statutory construction, the court
surmounted this impediment by liberally construing the intent of the
legislature to justify extension of the public interest factor to the water
transfer statute. 3
Having cleared this hurdle, the court was free to consider the litigants'
public interest arguments. Applicants contended that economic development resulting from the proposed resort project would be in the public
interest because it would stimulate the local economy. 6 The resort would
generate construction jobs in the Ensenada area, such as the building of
second homes. 3' Eventually, the associated tourism industry would provide more local jobs, shifting the "previously poverty-stricken populace"
from an agricultural subsistence economy to an economy based on tour3s
ism.

An expert for Ensenada Association 39 countered that the development
of tourist/recreational facilities would not improve the inhabitants' financial outlook.' Rather, the resort project would provide only menial jobs,
such as waiters and maids." Overall, most locals would never realize
any benefits from the resort economy. 2 More importantly, Judge Art
Encinias stated that northern New Mexicans possess a fierce pride over
their history, traditions, and culture, with state and federal levels recognizing the region's cultural value. 3 He noted that the deeply rooted
traditional ties of northern New Mexicans to the land and water are central
to the maintenance of that culture.' Economic development, by way of
a ski resort and subdivisions, would erode the community's agricultural
subsistence economy through the retirement of land and the additional
community burden as members opt out of the ditch system.45
Doubtless Judge Encinias' local roots and his accountability as an
elected official impacted his decision.' Persuaded by the expert's arguments, he held that the transfer would be against the public interest
because "construct[ing] a playground for those who can pay is a poor
35. Sleeper I, slip op. at 5-6.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 5-6.
39. Sylvia Rodriquez, a Rio Arriba County native with a Ph.D. in anthropology, was the expert
witness for Ensenada Association. She based her testimony on her extensive studies in Rio Arriba
County, specifically, in the Valdez area.
40. Sleeper 1. slip op. at 6.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. ld. at 6-7.
46. In October 1988, the attendees of the First Annual Convention of Acequia Associations
presented Judge Encinias with the First Annual Parciante Award for his outstanding public service
on behalf of the acequia (irrigation ditch) tradition. At the meeting, Encinias spoke of his decision
in Sleeper I. Tribal Peoples Survival, Winter 1988, at 4.
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trade" for contributing to the step-by-step destruction of the local culture,
devoted for more than a century to agriculture." 7
On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the statute in
effect at the time of the application precluded the state engineer from
considering broad public interest factors in the transfer of surface water."
At the time of the application, Section 72-5-23 allowed the state engineer
to transfer appropriated water if the change could "be made without
detriment to existing water rights."'49 As the transfer would not harm
existing rights, the court reversed."
Section 72-5-23," subsequently amended, 52 now requires the state engineer to deny an application if the change of use is detrimental to the
public welfare. Judge Encinias' holding is not precedent, but his rationale
in reaching his decision and the subsequent statutory amendment indicate
that the next Sleeper scenario may deliver a different outcome in New
Mexico. Regardless, "public welfare" is sufficiently nebulous to cloud
the predictability of any water transfer in which it plays a role, unless
the legislative branch clearly articulates relevant criteria.
ANALYSIS
In Sleeper, the district court and the appellate court divergently approached the proposed transfer application to reach conflicting holdings.
The district court used a "common sense view" to reach its conclusion
decisions.
that public interest was an inherent consideration in all water
53
It first examined New Mexico's water allocation statutes:
47. Sleeper i, slip op. at 6-7.
48. Sleeper Ii, 107 N.M. 494, 498, 760 P.2d 787, 791 (Ct. App. 1988).
49. N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-5-23 (1978) (amended Supp. 1985).
50. Sleeper H, 107 N.M. 499, 500, 760 P.2d 792, 793.
51. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-5-23 (Supp. 1985).
52. The addition of "public welfare" criteria to the groundwater statute was a direct result of
City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983) (El Paso 1). In El Paso I, El Paso
filed with the N.M. state engineer, pursuant to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12-3 (1978) (amended Supp. 1985),
226 applications for permits to appropriate water from the lower Rio Grande and Hueco Basins.
The state engineer denied the applications on the ground that the N.M. Constitution, art. XVI, §§ 2,
3. precluded use of New Mexico groundwater outside the borders of the state. Based upon Sporhase
v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), the United States district court held that New
Mexico's embargo on the export of water out-of-state violated the U.S. Constitution, art. I, §8,

cl. 3.
Immediately after the El Paso I decision, the New Mexico legislature amended the groundwater
statute to allow new appropriations and transfers of groundwater for out-of-state use, if not contrary
to the conservation of water or otherwise detrimental to the public welfare. City of El Paso v.
Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984) (El Paso ii), ruled the statute unconstitutional because
it did not apply the conservation and public welfare criteria evenhandedly; the criteria was inapplicable
to in-state appropriations of water. The New Mexico legislature responded again, adding the conservation and public welfare criteria to in-state appropriations in 1985. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§72-523, -24 (1985 Supp.). As a result, any allocation of New Mexico water now requires consideration
of public welfare.
53. The text of the cited statutes are from the 1978 Comp. (amended Supp. 1985).
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All natural waters flowing in streams and watercourses, whether such
be perennial, or torrential, within the limits of the state of New
Mexico, belong to the public and are subject to appropriation for
beneficial use. Section 72-1-2.
The State Engineer is a public official who "has general supervision
of waters of the state and of the measurement, appropriation, distribution thereof. Section 72-2-1.
If, in the opinion of the state engineer, there is no unappropriated
water available, he shall reject such application [for unappropriated
water]. . . .He may also refuse to consider or approve any application . . . if, in his opinion, approval thereof would be contrary to
public interest. Section 72-5-7.
[AJil or any part of the [appropriated water] right. . . may be transferred for other [than irrigationall purposes, without losing priority
of right theretofore established, if such changes can be made without
detriment to existing water rights. Section 72-5-23.
An appropriator of water ...may change the place of diversion,
storage or use in the manner and under the conditions prescribed in
72-5-3 and 72-5-23 NMSA 1978. Section 72-5-24.
The court noted the explicit requirement that the state engineer, under
Section 72-5-7, must consider the public interest in allocating unappropriated water.' It also mentioned that the state engineer, as a public
official under Section 72-2-1, was required to consider the public interest
in every decision involving water, which is defined as a public resource
subject to beneficial use under Section 72-1-2.' It was immaterial that
each statute affecting the state engineer did not explicitly require consideration of the public interest as the legislature implied that public interest
should be considered in every state engineer decision.' The court noted
interest review into the
that the 1985 Amendments incorporating public
57
statutes merely made the implication explicit.
The lower court's holding broadly applied the public trust doctrine"
through the public interest requirement articulated for unappropriated
water. By doing so, the court implicitly integrated public interest values
within the public trust doctrine.
Once the lower court resolved the applicability of public interest, it
weighed cultural survival against economic progression." Applicants'
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Sleeper 1. slip op. at 5.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 117-125.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-47.
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proffered that economic development in the Ensenada area would benefit
local inhabitants. In contrast, Ensenada Association contended that economic development would erode the integrity of the agricultural community. The lower court held that preservation of a cultural identity was
more desirable than economic development, and denied the application.6'
On appeal, the clear unambiguous language of the statute in effect at
the time of the application and its interpretive history tied the hands of
the appellate court. The court first looked to Section 72-5-76, the statute
applicable to unappropriated water. The court stated that long-standing
administrative constructions of statutes by the agency charged with administering them should be given great weight and should not be lightly
overturned.62 Thus, the state engineer's orders are presumed to be proper
implementation of the water laws.6" Additionally, the more long-standing
the state engineer's interpretation of the statutes without amendment by
the legislature, the more likely that the state engineer's interpretation
reflects legislative intent6 4 As the state engineer historically applied Section 72-5-7 only to transfers of unappropriated water, the court held
Section 72-5-7 inapplicable to transfers of appropriated water.6' Therefore, the court rejected Ensenada Association's contention that the court
base its decision on Section 72-5-7 and on its public interest criterion.'
The court then looked to the plain language of Sections 72-5-23 and
-24, which allow the transfer of appropriated surface water provided that
the change can be made without detriment to existing rights. The court
noted that the state engineer historically applied Sections 72-5-23 and 24 to transfers of appropriated water.6' Case law further supported the
state engineer's construction of the statutes." Under these sections, the
state engineer could deny proper water applications of appropriated water
only when the transfer would be detrimental to existing water rights.69
Consequently, the court held that the statutes in force at the time of the
application precluded denial of the requested transfer of appropriated
rights on the basis of general public interest considerations."
The court stated that public interest is relevant to water allocations
since Section 72-1-1 mandates that water is subject to appropriation for
beneficial use. 7 However, the court determined that the lower court's
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Sleeper i, slip op. at 6-7.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-5-7 (1978) (Supp. 1985).
Sleeper H, 107 N.M. 413, 498, 760 P.2d 787, 790, 791 (Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 498, 760 P.2d at 791.

Id.
Id.
Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 498, 760 P.2d at 791, 792.
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decision incorporated a broader view of public interest than the legislature
intended by "beneficial use." 2 The court held that the proposed transfer
was not detrimental to existing rights, compelling it to grant the transfer.73
PUBLIC WELFARE CRITERIA IN THE
PRIOR APPROPRIATION SYSTEM
The Purpose of Public Welfare Review
The prior appropriation doctrine is the primary and almost exclusive
water law doctrine in the seventeen contiguous western states and Alaska.'
A general consideration of the public welfare imposes the beneficial use
requirement conditioning all western water right appropriations,75 as the
Sleeper appellate court noted.7' Transferability of water rights can promote
the public welfare by enabling the uses of water to evolve in response to
changing needs and values.77 The timelessness of appropriative water
rights; the limited supply of water; and increasing industrial, economic,
and municipal demands compel water transfers. 8 Additionally, since existing water rights are more dependable and less costly than new, late
priority rights, they present enhanced marketability.79

To efficiently market water, economic forces demand well-defined,
fully transferable rights.' ° Although transfers generally promote public
welfare, employing public welfare criteria to protect aesthetic, environmental, recreational, or cultural interests may restrict the availability of

water and the free transferability of water rights.8 Thus, industrialization
and urbanization increasingly compete with other public values such as
preservation of cultural and natural environments.8 2 Consequently, water
controversies are merely the stage upon which social forces collide.
72. Id. at 499, 760 P.2d at 792.
73. Id. at 498, 760 P.2d at 791, 792.
74. Grant, Public InterestReview of Water RightAllocationand Transfer in the West: Recognition
of Public Values, 19 Ariz. St. L.J. 681-83 (1987).
75. Gould, Transfer of Water Rights, 29 Nat. Res. J. 457 (1989).
76. Sleeper !!, 107 N.M. at 498, 499, 760 P.2d 791, 792.
77. Johnson, The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation and the Changing West, A Report by the Staff
of the Western States Water Council, 24,24 (1987) (updated version, Johnson and DuMars, A Survey
of the Evolution of Western Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest
Demands, 29 Nat. Res. J. 347 (1989)).
78. Gould, supra note 75.
79. Id. New, late priority rights may be undependable due to the priority rule and tremendous
seasonal and annual fluctuations in the flows of many western rivers. Id. As existing rights have
senior priority to these later, junior rights, senior right holders are first to use the water in times of
shortages. Id.
New priority rights frequently require the construction of storage facilities necessary to use the
water. Id. Since existing rights usually have the facilities needed to use the water, funds are not
required to construct storage facilities. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

The purpose of public welfare review is to maximize water resource
benefits through regulation of externalities, thereby protecting public values. 3 Externalities exist when a person's water use affects others, but
the user does not consider those effects, negative or positive, when deciding to engage in the use.' Thus, some of the costs or benefits of the
use are external to the user's water-use decision." A typical externality
in a water transfer would be the effect on an endangered species when a
municipality's consumptive use of water irreversibly lowers the level of
a lake." As market forces sometimes fail to deal adequately with externalities, administrative agencies impose regulations. 7 However, private
property rights in water should be secure enough to encourage development, flexible enough for economic forces to change them for better
use, and subject to public regulation only when private economic action
does not protect the public interests." When private economic action,
such as the operation of a municipality for example, fails to protect the
public's interest in preserving an endangered species, then administrative
review of public welfare may be proper."'
While public welfare review retained the same purpose throughout its
development, courts and legislatures are reshaping the doctrine from its
earlier goal of maximizing economic development to one of greater productivity in both monetary and nonmonetary terms. ° Additionally, the
content of public welfare review, ever evolving, is broadening the view
of the benefits to be maximized. 9 The Idaho Supreme Court's finding
that the "affairs of the people in the area directly affected by the proposed
use" is implicit in the statutory phraseology "local public interest" reflects
this expanded view.92 As most definitions of public welfare do not attach
the adjective "local," "public welfare" may be defined as "the affairs
of the people." However, "people" is as imprecise as many of the statutes
requiring that the water-transfer decision include public welfare criteria.
Consequently, public welfare determinations are not only unpredictable,
but frequently compete with prior appropriation doctrine.
83. See Grant, supra note 74, at 702.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 361
(1983), cert. denied sub noma.L.A. Dept. of Water & Power v. National Audubon, 464 U.S. 977
(1983) (often referred to as the Mono Lake case) (municipalitiy's consumptive use of water threatened
endangered species).
87. Grant, supra note 74, at 702.
88. Trelease, Policiesfor Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and the Public Regulation, 5 Nat. Res. J. 1-2 (1965).
89. See Grant, supra note 74, at 702-03.
90. National Water Commission, Water Policies for the Future 227 (1973).
91. Grant, supra note 74, at 704.
92. Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 337, 707 P.2d 441, 448 (1985), discussed infra text accompanying notes 94-98.
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The Maturation of Public Welfare Criteria
Public welfare first became a factor in water appropriations in 1890,
when Wyoming set precedent by requiring an appropriator to obtain a
permit. 3 Wyoming's statute authorized the state engineer to reject appropriation requests detrimental to the public interest.' Sixteen of the
eighteen western states consider the public welfare when granting new
water applications.95 Eight western states include public welfare in review
of water transfer applications." Although state statutes vary, they are
comparable in that they either deny appropriations that are detrimental
to the public welfare or require consideration of the public welfare. Historically, public welfare determinations established that public welfare
was as significant a principle as prior appropriation.
During the early 1900s, public welfare was synonomous with maximum
economic development. In 1910, the New Mexico Territorial Supreme
97 upheld the territorial engiCourt, in Young & Norton v. Hinderlider,

neer's denial of new appropriation permits. The court based its holding
on the public interest in protecting investors against making worthless
investments in New Mexico and in favoring larger irrigation projects over

smaller ones.9" In 1911, in Cookinham v. Lewis,9" the Oregon state engineer applied the public welfare provisions of the state's Water Code to
deny permits when certain appropriation requests conflicted with the public welfare. The court upheld the state engineer's denial of the applications
because the public interest in unencumbered reclamation of the lands
weighed heavier than the economically motivated interests of the applicants.I In 1913, in In Re Commonwealth Power Company,' the Ne93. Grant, supra note 74, at 685.
94. Id.
95. Alaska Stat. §46.15.040, .080(a) (1987); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-153 (Supp. 1988); Cal.
Water Code §§ 1225, 1255 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989); Idaho Code Ann. 42-202(5) (Supp. 1988);
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§46-234, -2,116 (1984); Nev. Rev. Stat. §533.370(3) (1986); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§72-12-3(E) (Supp. 1985); N.D. Cent. Code §61-04-06 (1985); Or. Rev. Stat. § 537.170 (1988);
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 46-2A-9 (Rev. 1987); Tex. Water Code Ann. § 11.134(3) (Vernon 1988);
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1) (Supp. 1986); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 90.03.290 (Supp. 1989); Wyo.
Stat. § 41-9-31 (1977).
96. Idaho Code § 42-222(l) (Cum. Supp. 1988); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-708b (Cum. Supp. 1987);
Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2- 402(3) (1987) (where proposed change must be a "reasonable use," which
the statute defines in terms of typical public interest criteria); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 46-290, -294 (1984);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.370(3) (1986); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 72- 12-7, -12B- I (Supp. 1985); N.D. Cent.
Code § 61-04-15.1 (1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 46-2A- 12 (Rev. 1987).
97. 15 N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045 (1910).
98. Id. at 677, 678, 110 P. at 1049.
99. 58 Or. 484, 114 P. 88 (1911).
100. Id. "The [Oregon] Water Code (Act Feb. 24, 1909; Laws 1909, p. 319) was enacted in the
tight of and with reference to the desert land act (Laws 1901, p. 378) and Act Feb. 22, 1909 (Laws
1909, p. 377), substituted therefor, and which created the desert land board, and Act Feb. 22, 1905
(Laws 1905, p. 401), providing for acquiring land for the reclamation of arid lands." Id. at 484,
114 P.2d at 88.
101. 94 Neb. 613, 143 N.W. 937 (1913).
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braska State Water Board determined that a stream's water supply was
insufficient to support two power plants. The court upheld the board's
denial of the second application for the second plant as granting it would
defeat both projects and the public interest in promoting agricultural and
power generation development. " A few years later, in Big Horn Power
Company v. State,' 3 the Wyoming state engineer determined that public
interest precluded construction of a dam over thirty-five feet high where
the additional height would interfere with the only economical railroad
line through a canyon.
Oregon took the first step diverging from the traditional view that public
welfare was equivalent to maximum economic development. In 1929,
the Oregon legislature enacted a statute requiring the State Reclamation
Commission, when appropriating water, to include the effect upon public
recreation and commercial and game fishing within the scope of public
interest.'" Aside from this statute, the emergence of a broader definition
of public welfare was suspended until the 1960s. At that time public
welfare marshalled environmental, recreational, and aesthetic values within
its sphere, as determined by judicial and legislative actions.
For example, in 1966 Alaska enacted a water use act enumerating
various public interest factors: economics, fish and game resources, public
recreational activities, public health, harm to other persons, and losses
of alternate uses of water. °5 An Oregon statute also specified public
interest factors: the state water plan, flood control, conserving water for
public recreation, commercial and game fishing, wildlife, navigation, and
scenic attraction.'"
The Washington Supreme Court, in 1973, considered the state's interdisciplinary regulatory scheme in its consideration of the public welfare. In Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, " the court held that
the Water Resources Act of 1971 (WRA) 08s promoted a policy of pres102. Id. at 614-15, 143 N.W. at 938-39.
103. 23 Wyo. 271, 148P. 1110(1915).
104. Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 245, § 1, 1929 Or. Laws 252-53 (current amended version at Or.
Rev. Stat. § 537.170(5) (1985)).
105. Alaska Stat. §46.15.080(b) (1984):
In determining the public interest, the commissioner shall consider
(1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed application;
(2) the effect of the economic activity resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(3) the effect on fish and game resources and on public recreational activities;
(4) the effect on public health;
(5) the effect of losses of alternate uses of water that might be made within a reasonable
time if not precluded or hindered by the proposed appropriation;
(6) harm to other persons resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(7) the intent and ability of the applicant to complete the appropriation; and
(8) the effect upon access to navigable or public waters.
106. Or. Rev. Stat. § 537. 170(5) (1985).
107. 82 Wash.2d 109, 115, 508"P.2d 166, 122 (1973).
108. Wash. Rev. Code §§90.54.010-.910 (Supp. 1987).
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ervation of natural resources, aesthetic values, and the public health.
Moreover, the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA)'" required
state agencies to submit environmental impact statements for every major
action significantly affecting the quality of the environment.
In 1985, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld its Water Resources Department's denial of a permit for an appropriation that would harm the
environment and conflict with the local public interest." 0 Shokal interpreted the "local public interest" to be the affairs of the people in the
affected area, relying upon legislation related to the state's water appropriation statute, other states' public welfare statutes and academic community views."' Shokal used a common sense view to suggest that the
local public interest includes the list of factors detailed in Alaska's permit
statute " " in addition to other factors such as conservation."' The court
concluded that the legislature intended the term "local public interest,"
to include any locally important factor imposed by proposed legislation. ,4
The movement away from maximum economic development as the
primary public interest value includes local cultural considerations, with
Sleeper surfacing as a logical extension of public welfare values. Sleeper
represents the struggle to weigh clashing values. On one hand are intangible community values: aesthetics, the environment, fish and wildlife
habitats, and recreational values such as boating. Additionally, some
statutes envelop implied secondary economy-of-scale consequences, such
as when the transfer of part of the water from an irrigation district makes
the balance of the project infeasible. On the other hand are values related
to economic development, which are generally capable of monetary definition. These values comprise, for example, the private individual's
vested property interest in the free alienability of his water right, which
generates revenues if sold and allows the water to move to a higher
economically valued use. Preclusion of the right to transfer water, when
such a transfer is deemed contrary to the public welfare, invokes the issue
of whether the state's action is a taking without compensation. Cases
involving the related public trust doctrine discuss this issue.
The Relationship of Public Welfare to the
Public Trust Doctrine and the Takings Issue
While jurisdictions concur that the public trust doctrine subsumes public
welfare values, they differ on whether the doctrine is an alternate method
of protecting the public welfare or whether it compliments constitutional
109. Wash. Rev. Code §§42.21C.010-.910 (1983 & Supp. 1987).
110. Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 707 P.2d 441, 441 (1985).

111. Id. at 337, 707 P.2d at 448.
112. See supra note 105.
113. Shokal, 109 Idaho at 338, 707 P.2d at 449.

114. Id. at 338, 339, 707 P.2d at 449, 450.
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and statutory authority.'" ' They concur that the public trust doctrine,
providing "that all waters of the state are held in trust by the state for
the people,"" 6 is "an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the
people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands, and tidelands."" 7 The state, as trustee, can transfer the right to use the trust
property so long as the transfer does not impair the public trust.' Once
the state approves an appropriation, the public trust imposes a duty of
continuing supervision over the taking and use of appropriated water,
including review of vested water rights." 9
For instance, in California, reconsideration of vested water rights resulting in a state-authorized appropriation of water was not an unconstitutional taking because state-authorized appropriations of water are subject
to the public trust. 20 When the water right is exercised in a manner
inconsistent with the public trust, the state has a right to protect trust
interests. 2 ' As the state only relinquishes control over those interests
when their use is in harmony with the public trust, its reconsideration of
vested rights impairing the public
trust is not a taking, even if it would
22
be in the absence of the trust.
Analogously, courts could find that denial of water transfers on the
basis of public welfare factors'do not cause significant economic deprivation to the right holders as to constitute a taking. However, when an
administrator or a court finds the public welfare value in water so strong
that the right cannot be transferred, it may be a taking without compensation, as a California party is currently arguing.' 23 In a Sleeper situation,
the holder of a nontransferable water right retains the use of the water
but loses unrelated values: the right to use his property and to live his
life in the manner he chooses. Additionally, his land and water rights are
reduced in value due to inability to transfer the water out of agriculture.
Takings issues arise where property is reduced in value below the market
price and the right holder is unable to make a reasonable profit on his
crops. 2 " The state's action may be a taking when the public welfare
115. See Johnson, supra note 77, at 23.
116. See Robie, The Public Interest in Water Rights Administration, 23 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst.
917, 928 (1977).
117. Mono Lake, 33 Cal.3d. at 434, 658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
118. Robie, supra note 117, at 926.
119. Mono Lake, 33 Cal.3d 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
120. Id., 658 P.2d at 721, 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357, 359.
121. Id., 658 P.2d at 721, 722, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357, 358.
122. See also, Orion Corporation v. Washington, 109 Wash.2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 1996 (1988) (regulation restricting right to fill tidelands was not a taking as they
were subject to the public trust).
123. Further proceedings in Mono Lake. The California State Attorney General predicts that the
takings issue will be raised in the context of water right regulations.
124. See Orion at 659, 747 P.2d at 1082.
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determination is the proximate cause of the holder's inability to make a
reasonable profit.' 25 However, if the public trust doctrine subsumes the
public welfare doctrine so as to apply public trust principles to the situation, then there may be no taking. Ironically, should the right holder
whom the state precluded from transferring his water go out of business,
then his property rights would be marketable. Where the holder is forced
to transfer the water rights to a nonagricultural use, the gains of the initial
transfer restriction would be obliterated.
Where the potential for subsistence-threatening consequences exist,
clear standards should regulate the application of public welfare criteria.
However, the public welfare transition away from economic values is
characterized by fact-specific precedent and by lack of standards and
certainty. Therefore, statutes which require consideration of public welfare present a classic question of statutory interpretation and the corresponding question of separation of powers.
CONCLUSION
Arguably, the Sleeper appellate court could have affirmed the lower
court's application of public welfare through a public trust interpretation.
As the California Supreme Court determined, state water laws have not
displaced the state's inherent authority as trustee of public waters so as
to preclude a weighing of competing values in water allocations.' 2 6 Indeed, the public trust doctrine gives the state independent authority to
reexamine and modify appropriative water rights.' 27 For both the public
welfare doctrine and the public trust doctrine, the natural expansion of
current values such as Idaho's "local public interest" encompasses secondary water allocation effects such as the erosion of local community
cultures.
Whether the public welfare doctrine or public trust doctrine is used in
the allocation decision, the balancing of community values against economic values to determine the greater public interest remains problematic.
In Sleeper, the district court made a value judgment that the scale tipped
to preserve the local culture. As most statutes do not oversee this type
of balancing, case-by-case determinations reflect subjective values.
Both the state water agency in the executive branch and the legislative
branch of the government participate in public welfare determinations,
with the judiciary frequently becoming involved. Ideally, the legislative
branch is the proper authority to direct the other branches in the decisions.
The legislative branch is accountable to its constituents and has the re125. See id.
126. See Johnson, supra note 77, at 21, 22 (discussing Mono Lake).
127. Id.
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sources to ascertain their best interests. Where the constituents' interests
are broad or conflicting, the legislative branch is best equipped to decree
who constitutes the "public" for purposes of the public welfare. In contrast, the state engineer is usually a technical expert, frequently without
political expertise and typically unaccountable to a political body. His
reliance upon facts presented at the hearing may limit the scope of his
decision. The judiciary may also have limited access to relevant facts.
To ensure that water transfer decisions accurately reflect public welfare
values, state, regional, and local governments should actively participate
in defining public values. They may promulgate guidelines in a variety
of manners: enumeration of public welfare values, use preference and
protection of area-of-origin statutes, zoning ordinances, and other innovative ways flexible enough to reflect changing public values. 2 ' For
example, post-Sleeper,the relevant local county commission adopted land
use regulations governing water supplies for new subdivisions." 9 The
regulations protect traditional agricultural uses of water, stating that the
transfer of water rights from traditional uses to residential subdivision or
commercial uses'do not, in general, promote the public welfare. 3 '
The consolidated effort to specify public welfare values at state, regional, and local governmental levels should result in more efficient, just
administrative and judicial processes, along with predictability and dependability for the public. Most importantly, significant public values
will be better assured of protection.
SHANNON A. PARDEN

128. Id. at 36-40.
129. Rio Arriba County, N.M., Land Subdivision Regulations, art. 11(rev. May 13, 1987). These
regulations are currently being challenged in the First Judicial District in New Mexico, Coalition
for the Preservation of Private Property Rights v. Board of County Commissioners, No, RA 1442
(C), No. RA 319 (C) (Consolidated). See Miller, Existing and Proposed Authority for Land-Use
Regulation for the Preservation of Agricultural Lands, 3 N.M. Nat. Res. L. Rptr. 53 (1988).
130. Rio Arriba County, N.M., Land Subdivision Regulations, art. 11(rev. May 13, 1987).

